Walt Philbin Remembers (continued)
Major Jarvis Lynch, the battalion's Operations Officer a month after the DMZ on operation Meade River. Lynch argued vehemently against concentrating so many Marines in such a vulnerable position, to no avail. Photo by Kent Wonders.
The B-52 Strike Is On
The day of the first attack, I remember listening on the radio to Major Lynch, call sign John Brown 3, and hearing Echo go out on a patrol and immediately encountering what they believed to be token contact.
But then the general back in the rear at Quang Tri or Dong Ha or wherever, call sign Alexander Graham 6, worrying that Echo might be chewed up by an NVA division and ordering them to return to the LZ while he B-52’ed behind them.
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Then I remember Major Lynch, the Annapolis grad, trying to talk the general into keeping Echo out there, that it was only token resistance and that if the general made us return all the grunt companies to LZ Margo’s hill, which the NVA had no doubt registered, we would be like “fish in a bowl” for them.
But Major Lynch couldn’t change Alexander Graham 6’s mind.
He was dead set on having B-52s work the area where Echo encountered the contact, so he wanted everyone a click [kilometer] away from that too.
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He insisted that the grunts return.
